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CASENOTES
WHO SAID "THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME?":
FRANCHISE RELOCATION IN PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The old adage "Home, Sweet Home"' implies that one would never
be unhappy in that special environment called home. In the Wizard of
Oz, the story of Dorothy's desperate longing journey to return to her
home in Kansas, the Good Witch of the North finally tells her to close
her eyes, tap her heels and say, "There's no place like home! There's no
place like home!"2 The question then is why, if home is such a great
place to be, would anyone want to leave it?
In the world of sports, the local franchise is called "the home team."
If a team is successful, it can inspire local fan support that goes beyond
the imaginable. The team and its players are usually well-established,
recognized members of their community, and the favorites are often local
heroes.
On the other hand, visiting teams are often poorly received by the
partial hometown fans. When visitors beat the home team, some fans
may become vengeful and bombard the visitors with boos or even sta-
dium trash. Visiting teams usually cannot wait to get back home. So, if
indeed "there's no place like home," why would a sports franchise want
to leave its hometown and relocate?
The National Basketball Association's San Diego Clippers franchise
apparently did not think home was so sweet, or maybe did not think that
San Diego was truly their home. When Alan Rothenberg, president of
the Clippers, decided to move his team to Los Angeles, he caused quite
an uproar because the National Basketball Association ("NBA") claimed
the move violated its rule on relocation. This casenote explores the rea-
sons why the San Diego Clippers wanted to move, the basis for the
NBA's franchise relocation rule, and finally focuses on National Basket-
1. Clari, the Maid of Milan (1823) said: "Home, Sweet Home." THE OXFORD DICTION-
ARY OF QUOTATIONS 370 (3d ed. 1979).
2. J. H. Payne said: "There's no place like home! There's no place like home!" THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 370 (3d ed. 1979).
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ball Association v. SDC Basketball Club 3 ("SDC Basketball Club"), the
lawsuit resulting from the Clippers' relocation. In addition, a brief his-
tory of federal antitrust law will be examined, followed by a thorough
discussion of how the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied federal
antitrust laws to franchise relocation restrictions in professional sports.4
The conclusion will concentrate on the application of the Ninth Circuit's
analysis to the SDC Basketball Club case.
II. WHY THE SAN DIEGO CLIPPERS MOVED NORTH
Until May 15, 1984, the Clippers basketball team, an NBA franchise
member, played their home games in the San Diego Sports Arena. While
in San Diego, the Clippers consistently had among the worst win-loss
records in the NBA. 5 As a result of their unaccomplished play and poor
winning percentage, the Clippers lost fan support in great numbers.6
In the early 1980's, the San Diego Clippers ownership notified the
NBA that they wanted to move to Los Angeles.7 In response, the NBA
filed suit against the Clippers in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California to enjoin the move.8 The suit was
brought by the NBA so that it could sanction the Clippers for moving to
3. 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987).
4. The principal federal antitrust law that applies to the San Diego Clippers case is the
Sherman Act, which is designed to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies. The applicable sections state in part:
§ 1:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal....
§ 2:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony ....
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2 (West 1973 & Supp. 1988).
Direct evidence of an agreement or concerted action between two or more people is re-
quired to violate § I. The mere fact that people act similarly does not mean they have
conspired.
5. In 1981, the Clippers record was 36 wins and 46 losses. They finished 21 games behind
the first place team. See L.A. Times, Mar. 30, 1981, § 3, at 11, col. 1. In 1982, their record
was a dismal 17 wins and 65 losses, and the Clippers finished 39 games out of first place. See
L.A. Times, Apr. 17, 1982, § 3, at 13, col. 3. The Clippers 1983 season in San Diego produced
25 wins and 57 losses, leaving them only 33 games behind the first place team. See L.A. Times,
Apr. 18, 1983, § 3, at 12, col. 5.
6. See infra note 219.
7. National Basketball Assoc. v. SDC Basketball Club ("SDC Basketball Club"), 815
F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 362 (1987).
8. See Brief of Appellee SDC Basketball Club, Inc., at 8, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987)
(No. 86-5891).
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Los Angeles without first obtaining league approval.9 As a result of the
NBA's action, the Clippers were forced to abort their effort to move be-
cause the NBA refused to schedule their home games in Los Angeles.1°
The parties eventually resolved the suit by entering into stipulations and
orders dismissing the pending lawsuits."
Consequently, the Clippers continued to play basketball in San
Diego. But the team was frustrated by the San Diego Sports Arena
building; which, according to the San Diego appellate court, was consid-
ered damaged and structurally unfit for professional basketball. 2 In
fact, the Clippers obtained a breach of contract judgment against the
arena operators because the court found that they had failed to ade-
quately maintain the stadium according to the terms of the contract.
1 3
Undaunted, Alan Rothenberg declared that the Clippers were mov-
ing to Los Angeles in 1984. He claimed that any attempt by the NBA to
restrain the move would violate federal antitrust laws."' This announce-
ment was made following the decision in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League15 ("Raiders I"). In Raiders I, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying a "rule of
reason" analysis, 6 held that the franchise relocation restriction of the
National Football League ("NFL") was not immune from antitrust
law. 7 Because the NFL's franchise relocation restriction was so similar
9. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 564-65.
10. Id.
11. L.A. Times, Aug. 2, 1986, § 3, at 2, col. 1. On December 12, 1982, and February 11,
1983, the parties entered into stipulations and orders dismissing the pending lawsuits. At the
NBA's insistence, the stipulated dismissal order contained a "venue clause" stating:
If any action shall be commenced by or against any of the plaintiffs on the one hand,
by or against SDC or their successors or assigns, within two years from the date
hereof, concerning in any way the relocation or transfer of the San Diego NBA
franchise, any such action shall be commenced and maintained only in the United
States District Court, Southern District of California, in the city of San Diego.
Brief of Appellee SDC Basketball Club, Inc. at 8, SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.
1987).
12. L.A. Times, Aug. 2, 1986, § 3, at 2, col. 1.
13. Id.
14. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 564.
15. 726 F.2d 1381, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that:
(1) the NFL was not [a] "single entity" for purposes of federal antitrust law; (2) [the]
evidence supported [the] jury's determination that the rule was an unreasonable re-
straint of trade; (3) [the] trial court was not obliged to specifically instruct [the] jury
on [the] NFL's theory that the restraint involved was ancillary to [a] valid joint ven-
ture agreement; and (4) [the] trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying [a]
change of venue motion based on pretrial publicity. Id.
16. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. N.F.L. ("Raiders I"), 726 F.2d 1381 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). See infra text accompanying notes 70-91.
17. See supra note 15. Also see addendum for the NFL's rule on franchise relocation.
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to the NBA's franchise relocation restriction, the NBA chose not to in-
terfere with the Clippers' move at that time.18 In fact, the NBA sched-
uled the Clippers' home games in Los Angeles to avoid any potential
liability.19 Relentlessly, however, the NBA continued to attack the
Clippers' relocation as a violation of NBA rules, and the dispute
culminated in the SDC Basketball Club case.2"
III. THE NBA's FRANCHISE RELOCATION RULE
From its inception, the NBA has restricted and prohibited team
franchise movement.2" The restriction, originally stated in article 9 of
the NBA Constitution, categorically denied NBA teams from journeying
into another team's territory with plans to remain indefinitely and con-
duct business, without first obtaining the resident team's permission.22
Moreover, article 9 could not be amended without the express consent of
all the existing NBA member teams.23
Article 9 was invalidated, although not removed from the NBA
Constitution, on June 26, 1984.24 The NBA Commissioner declared arti-
cle 9 void upon NBA counsel's opinion that the provision was probably
unenforceable given the ruling in the Raiders I case.2 5 In SDC Basket-
ball Club, the trial court judge stated: "I think, based on the Raiders
decision . . . that rule [article 9] is no damn good."' 26 As a result, there
was "a void in the NBA Constitution with respect to club relocations.
27
As an attempt to fill this void, the NBA drafted and adopted the
current rule, article 9A. Article 9A is the NBA's dispositive modern
franchise relocation rule that regulates franchise movement. 28 To qualify
for relocation under article 9A, the moving franchise must, among other
prerequisites, obtain approval from a simple majority of member teams.29
18. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 564.
19. Id. at 564.
20. 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 362 (1987).
21. See infra addendum for articles 9 and 9A of the NBA Constitution.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Brief of Appellant National Basketball Association, at 22, n.16, SDC Basketball
Club, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-5891).
25. Id.
26. See Brief of Appellee SDC Basketball Club, Inc., at 22, SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d
562 (9th Cir. 1987).
27. Id. at 24.
28. See infra addendum for article 9A of the NBA Constitution.
29. See Brief of Appellee SDC Basketball Club, Inc., at 35, SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d
562 (9th Cir. 1987). Also see addendum.
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IV. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION V.
SDC BASKETBALL CLUB
A. Rules Are Rules - Or Are They?
The NBA contended that the Clippers could not move to Los
Angeles because article 9 of the NBA Constitution provided that no team
could move into a territory occupied by another franchise without that
franchise's prior approval.30 However, since the Los Angeles Lakers
waived their rights in writing under article 9, the Clippers satisfied this
requirement.3' The NBA argued that in addition to the Lakers' waiver,
the "league as a body must be permitted to consider [all franchise] moves
in order to give effect to a number of constitutional provisions for the
exclusiveness of franchise territories."32 In other words, the NBA con-
tended that article 9 only limited its actions as a league, but did "not
prescribe the only strictures on franchise movement."33 In response, the
Clippers argued that such "consideration by the NBA of the Clippers'
move would violate the antitrust laws."
'34
Meanwhile, the NBA began drafting what became article 9A, and
then attempted to apply it retroactively to the Clippers' move.35 The
Clippers claimed that such an amendment to article 9 could not be ap-
plied to their move retroactively because the NBA had not complied with
the NBA Constitution, which required unanimous approval from mem-
ber teams before such an amendment could become effective.36 The
NBA countered by arguing that article 9A was a "new constitutional
provision codifying previous practice."37 In other words, the NBA ar-
gued that article 9A was an amendment to the NBA Constitution and
not an amendment to article 9; thus, it was not necessary for the NBA to
obtain unanimous member approval.
The Clippers attacked the NBA's contention that article 9A was a
"new" constitutional provision rather than an amendment to article 9.38
The Clippers pointed out that the NBA had labelled the new rule "article
9A," thus showing by its own title that it was an amendment to article
9.39 The Clippers cited article 17(a) of the NBA Constitution entitled
30. See infra addendum for the NBA's rule on franchise relocation.
31. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 564.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 565.
35. Id. at 564. See infra addendum for article 9A.
36. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 564.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The Clippers argued in their brief that:
1990]
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"Amendments" which provides:
Except as otherwise provided for in this Constitution, the
Constitution of the Association may be amended by the votes
of three-fourths (3/4) of all the Governors. Article 17(a) by its
express terms is only applicable where there is no otherwise ap-
plicable provision with respect to the votes required for valid
amendment.'
The Clippers argued that the language of article 9 is clear and une-
quivocal.41 It states, "this provision as to territorial restrictions may be
amended only with the consent of all [the NBA member clubs]." 42
Therefore, the three-fourths (3/4) rule of article 17, arguably, does not
apply to article 9 because article 9 has its own amendment provision.
Furthermore, because the Clippers voted against adopting article 9A at
the June 1984 Board of Governors meeting, article 9A was not unami-
nously approved. Thus, the Clippers argued, article 9A does not apply to
their move since it was not properly incorporated into the NBA
Constitution before they moved to Los Angeles.43
The Clippers next argued that even if article 9A was properly incor-
porated into the NBA Constitution, it could not be retroactively applied
because the NBA Constitution does not contain a provision allowing for
such retroactive application." Therefore, article 9A could not be applied
to the Clippers' May 1984 move because it would not have gone into
before [the NBA] had litigation-inspired motives for twisting the facts, the NBA
itself recognized that provisions adding a new lettered section to an article are
amendments to that article itself. For example, article 35 was amended by the addi-
tion of new paragraphs (j) and (k); the resolution described these additions as amend-
ments to article 35. . . . Furthermore, article 9A deals with the very same subject
matter as did article 9-club relocations-and it changes the substantive rights and
obligations of the parties which had been codified in article 9. It is, therefore, an
amendment to article 9 in the ordinary sense of the term. (Emphasis original)
Brief of Appellee SDC Basketball Club, Inc. at 26, n. 11, SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562.
40. Brief of Appellee SDC Basketball Club, Inc. at 27, n. 12, SDC Basketball Club, 815
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987). All of the NBA teams have a vote when amendments to the NBA
Constitution are proposed. Presently the teams are: Atlanta Hawks, Boston Celtics, Chicago
Bulls, Cleveland Cavaliers, Dallas Mavericks, Denver Nuggets, Detroit Pistons, Golden State
Warriors (San Francisco), Houston Rockets, Indiana Pacers, Los Angeles Clippers, Los Ange-
les Lakers, Milwaukee Bucks, New Jersey Nets, New York Knickerbockers, Philadelphia
76ers, Phoenix Suns, Portland Trailblazers, Sacramento Kings, San Antonio Spurs, Seattle
Supersonics, Utah Jazz and the Washington Bullets. The Charlotte Hornets and the Miami
Heat entered the NBA starting with the 1988-89 season. The Minnesota Timberwolves and
the Orlando Magic will enter the NBA starting with the 1989-90 season.
41. Brief of Appellee SDC Basketball Club, Inc. at 27, SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562
(9th Cir. 1987).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 24, n.10.
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effect until sometime in June 1984, when the NBA Board of Governors
convened.4" The Clippers' final argument was that even if article 9 or
article 9A did apply, the notion of franchise relocation rules in profes-
sional sports violates antitrust law under the rule of reason analysis,
4 6
and therefore, it could not be used to bar their move.
B. NBA's Response To The Clippers' Move
The NBA brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California seeking a declaratory judgment to pro-
hibit the Clippers' move to Los Angeles without seeking prior league ap-
proval.47 In addition, the NBA sought damages from the Clippers for
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract,48 as well as from the Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission ("LAMCC") for tortious in-
terference with contractual relations between the NBA and one of its
league members.49 In response, the Clippers and LAMCC counter-
claimed against the NBA and the other individual league teams, seeking
a "declaratory judgment that consideration by the NBA of the Clippers'
move would violate the antitrust laws.",
50
After reviewing a multitude of pleadings and denying five motions
for summary judgment, Judge Nielsen of the district court suggested that
the NBA could not win given the ruling in Raiders 151 Judge Nielsen
relied on the Raiders I decision, and granted the Clippers summary judg-
ment,52 stating:
I have to say that, although I felt the law required me to deny
the motions for summary judgment all the way around, I really
don't see how the NBA can win this lawsuit. I think your
chances of winning are somewhere between slim and none in
light of the Raiders case ... I think you're in deep water with-
45. Id. at 24.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 79-91.
47. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 564-65.
48. Id. at 565.
49. Id. The Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission owns and operates the Los
Angeles Sports Arena where the Clippers play their home games.
50. Id. at 565. See supra note 40 for list of league teams.
51. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 565. The court's exact language was: "Well, I can't
see spending what I now foresee as at least two to three months of my time and the jury's time
on this case without some instruction from the circuit. So the motion for summary judgment
is granted." Appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of their motion
for summary reversal at 4, SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-5891).
52. Brief for Appellee National Basketball Association at 12, SDC Basketball Club, 815
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987).
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out a paddle and your life jacket is leaking. 53
The court's order granted the Clippers and LAMCC declaratory relief,
but dismissed the Clippers' and LAMCC's claims for damages for viola-
tion of antitrust laws. 54
Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League55
("Raiders I") regarding damages and state law claims. The Ninth Cir-
cuit in Raiders H found that:
the "expansion opportunity" in Los Angeles represented an ex-
tremely valuable expansion possibility for the league .... The
value of the Los Angeles opportunity arose not only from the
economic potential of one of the nation's largest media mar-
kets, but also from the NFL's well-established and widely fol-
lowed nationwide entertainment product. That product had
developed over the years into a geographically diverse structure
of teams, with traditions, rivalries, well-known players and na-
tional media interest, all of which greatly enhanced the value of
any expansion opportunity. If and when the NFL placed an
expansion team in the Los Angeles area, the accumulated value
of the Los Angeles opportunity would have been realized by the
NFL through charging the new expansion team owner for the
expansion opportunity.
5 6
In other words, when the Raiders moved from Oakland to Los Angeles,
they reaped a windfall represented by the "expansion opportunity" in
Los Angeles. Accordingly, the Raiders H court found that the Raiders,
by moving to Los Angeles, should compensate the NFL for taking the
expansion opportunity." The Raiders H1 court, therefore, determined
that the judgment in Raiders I, given to the Raiders, should be offset by
the value of the Los Angeles opportunity. 8
In light of the above, it is obvious why the NBA, in SDC Basketball
Club, argued for compensation for the "expansion opportunity" usurped
by the San Diego Clippers when they moved to Los Angeles. Addition-
ally, the NBA requested that the Ninth Circuit reverse the district
court's summary judgment ruling on all other counts and remand the
53. Id.
54. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 565.
55. 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 92 (1987).
56. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League ("Raiders I"),
791 F.2d 1356, 1371 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 92 (1987) (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 1373.
58. Id.
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case for trial.59
C. Summary Judgment For SDC Basketball Club Reversed
In SDC Basketball Club, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged that there was a justiciable controversy. 6' Although the
court of appeals did not use a precise test to determine the difference
between an abstract question and an actual controversy, it declared that
a district court's determination of whether a ruling for summary judg-
ment is proper depends on whether there are facts alleged showing that
"there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment."'"
The circuit court stated that summary judgment could only be up-
held if there were no issues of material fact.6 2 The circuit court deter-
mined that summary judgment was rare with antitrust cases because of
the factually complex issues of motive and intent.63 The court of appeals
concluded that there were pervasive issues of material fact including:
(1) Whether there was a duty of good faith and fair dealing between the
NBA and the Clippers; (2) Whether either party breached that duty; and
(3) Whether the NBA Constitution expressly or impliedly provided for
recovery of "expansion opportunity" damages.A Because issues of mate-
rial fact existed, the summary judgment granted to SDC Basketball Club
by the district court was reversed and the whole case remanded to the
59. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 565 (citing Raiders 11, 791 F.2d at 1371-73).
60. Id. at 566.
61. Id. at 565 (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,
273 (1941)).
62. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 566-67. See e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), reh'g denied, 334 U.S. 862 (1948).
In Times-Picayune, the Court stated:
While the completed offense of monopolization under § 2 [of the Sherman Act] de-
mands only a general intent to do the act, "for no monopolist monopolizes uncon-
scious of what he is doing," a specific intent to destroy competition or build
monopoly is essential to guilt for the mere attempt now charged. (citations)
Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 626. See also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 814 (1946); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431-32
(2d Cir. 1945); Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the
Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 373 (1973-74).
63. Id. In section 2 of the Sherman Act, motive and intent are two of the elements consti-
tuting an attempt to monopolize. See supra note 4 for Sherman Act § 2.
64. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 569-70. Also see supra text accompanying note 56
for "expansion opportunity" explanation.
19901
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district court for determination.65
The circuit court also focused on the NBA's declaratory judgment
claim, and again perceived a substantial controversy. The NBA asked
for allowance to assess and evaluate the limits of franchise relocation
within the NBA without violating antitrust laws.6 6 In response, the
Clippers asserted that if the NBA imposed or considered a sanction on a
team for relocating, it would be an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of the antitrust laws. 6 The circuit court found each party in
direct conflict and held that "[s]ince the NBA's 'real and reasonable ap-
prehension,' [citation omitted] was that any action on the Clippers' move
could result in antitrust liability, the case is justiciable."
68
The court of appeals did not rule on whether or not the NBA's
franchise relocation rule comported with federal antitrust laws, but did
state that the antitrust issue of professional sports franchise relocation
restrictions should be decided according to Raiders I and Raiders I. 69
This casenote will focus on the fact that the NBA's franchise relocation
rule, as applied to the San Diego Clippers' move, violated federal anti-
trust law, and therefore, the Clippers' move could not have been barred
by the NBA.
V. BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "[e]very contract, combina-
tion ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade ... is declared to be illegal."7
The purpose of section 1 of the Sherman Act is to prevent competitors
from making agreements which would tend to unreasonably eliminate or
reduce competition resulting in harm to consumers. 7' Thus, to have a
section 1 violation, there must be an agreement made by a plurality of
actors that inhibits competition and harms consumers. Because Con-
65. Id.
66. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 566-67.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 567.
70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1973 & Supp. 1988). Professional and non-professional sports
that are subject to § 1 analysis include hockey, football and tennis. See National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). Also see North Am.
Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1074 (1982); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519
F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990
(1984); and Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 378, 668 P.2d 674,
194 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984).
71. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1391.
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gress could not have intended to have "every contract" declared illegal,72
courts have developed two tests to determine (a) whether the agreement
is so anticompetitive that it is illegal per se, or (b) whether the agreement
requires a more in-depth review provided for by the rule of reason analy-
sis.7 3 This section will discuss two main points: (1) the necessity of con-
certed action to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act; and (2) the two
tests courts use to determine the legality of agreements questioned by
federal antitrust laws.
A. Concerted Action: Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (Single Business
Entities) Are Not Scrutinized Under Section 1 Of The
Sherman Act
To violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, it is imperative that con-
certed action exist. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.74
("Copperweld"), the United States Supreme Court found that conduct
which is wholly unilateral is not reached by the restraint of trade provi-
sion of the Sherman Act." The issue in Copperweld was whether coordi-
nated activity of a parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiary
should be viewed as a single business enterprise, or as a combination ca-
pable of conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act.76 Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, held that it is impossible as a matter of
law for a wholly-owned subsidiary to conspire with a parent company
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 7 The limited holding concluded
only that "the coordinated behavior of a parent and subsidiary falls
outside the reach of section ."78 In other words, a single business entity,
acting unilaterally, cannot violate section 1, despite its anti-competitive
behavior.
B. Per Se Rule Of Illegality vs. Rule Of Reason
Once it is determined that there is concerted action between two
separate business entities, the question becomes whether or not that ac-
tion violates section 1 of the Sherman Act. In National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States79 ("Professional Engineers"), Jus-
72. Id. at 1386.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 79-91.
74. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
75. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., ("Copperweld") 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
76. Id. at 759-77.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 753.
79. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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tice Stevens, writing for the majority, cited two categories of antitrust
analysis:
In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary
effect are so plainly anti-competitive that no elaborate study of
the industry is needed to establish their illegality-they are "il-
legal per se[]" [I]n the second category are agreements whose
competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons why it was imposed. In either event, the purpose of the
analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive signifi-
cance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favor-
ing competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the
members of an industry. 0
1. Per Se Rule
Justice Stevens first focused on agreements that are illegal per se.
Illegal per se agreements include, for example, price fixing agreements,8'
agreements to divide markets, 82 and tying agreements.8 3 However, in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States8 4 ("Standard Oil"), the Supreme Court
determined that the antitrust act "should be construed in the light of
reason; and, as so construed, it prohibits all contracts and combinations
which amount to an unreasonable or undue restraint of trade .... "85 As
a result, Standard Oil suggests that the evidence in a case is weighed to
determine whether the restrictive practice imposes an "unreasonable or
undue restraint of trade" on competition. 86 As courts have become more
experienced with issues involving antitrust problems, they have found
that agreements which are so consistently unreasonable are illegal per se,
and do not require an elaborate inquiry into the purported justifications
80. National Soc'y. of Professional Eng'rs v. United States ("Professional Engineers"), 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
81. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y., 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. R. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
84. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
85. Standard Oil Co. v. United States ("Standard Oil"), 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911). "The Rule
of Reason suggested by Mitchel v. Reynolds has been regarded as a standard for testing the
enforceability of covenants in restraint of trade which are ancillary to a legitimate transaction
.... .National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978)(citing
Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711)).
86. Id.
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for these agreements.8 7 Courts opt to use the per se approach for types of
business agreements which, over time, have been found to be "consist-
ently unreasonable and ... plainly anticompetitive.""8 Thus, when anti-
trust issues arise in areas where courts have limited experience, the rule
of reason analysis should be utilized instead.
2. Rule Of Reason
If a particular kind of business agreement is not illegal per se, then
the rule of reason analysis will be employed. This judicially created rule
requires the fact finder to consider all of the evidence presented and to
balance the anti-competitive effects against the pro-competitive virtues to
determine whether there is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation
of antitrust laws. 9 The accepted approach to rule of reason analysis is
found in Justice Brandeis' opinion in Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States9" ("Chicago Board"), which states:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition,
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion. To determine that question the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or prob-
able. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because
a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regula-
tion, or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.9"
VI. THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW To SPORTS
LEAGUE RESTRICTIONS
The unique business nature of a sports league or franchise requires
cooperation among its participants in order to survive. Each league team
must cooperate with the other league teams to produce its sport. Teams
must agree on, among other things, a site to play at and rules to follow.
The unique nature of agreements between teams in sports leagues, as well
87. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1388-89.
88. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. N.F.L., 468 F. Supp. 154, 165 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
89. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1387.
90. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
91. Id.
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as their business practices, has become the subject of many antitrust
cases. 
92
Sports leagues generally establish rules and regulations which gov-
ern the agreements and business practices of league members. Without
such agreements, the league would not be able to produce its sport. Be-
cause sports leagues create these rules and regulations, they claim to be
single business entities. 93 As a single business entity, a sports league
would be exempt from section 1 of the Sherman Act.94 This section will
discuss two issues in analyzing antitrust law as applied to sports leagues.
The first is whether courts accept the argument that a sports league is a
single business entity not governed by section 1 restrictions. The second
point explores what test to apply to resolve antitrust issues in sports
leagues.
A. Single Entity Exemption From Section 1?
In the past, the NFL has asserted that the unitary nature of the
product it creates - NFL football - implies that it is a single entity. 95
However, in Raiders I, the district court found that the NFL is not the
"'parent' of any league member, nor do any two clubs have a common
owner. The clubs do not share key operational personnel. [In fact,] the
NFL itself has conceded that the 'existence of actual or potential inter-
club competition in certain areas [does not exist].' "96
Consequently, the district court in Raiders I directed a verdict for
the plaintiffs and declared that the "NFL's member teams should be
treated as separate business enterprises ... rather than as components of
a single business entity."97 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision finding that each NFL team is an entity distinct
from the NFL for purposes of federal antitrust law.98 After it was deter-
mined that the NFL's single entity defense for a violation of section 1
would not succeed, the court went on to determine whether or not to
apply the per se or rule of reason analysis to the NFL's franchise reloca-
tion rule. 99
92. See supra note 70 for example of antitrust cases.
93. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519
F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990
(1984).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
95. Raiders I, 519 F. Supp. at 583.
96. Id. at 583, n. 1.
97. Id. at 585.
98. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1390.
99. Id.
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B. Per Se Rule Of Illegality vs. Rule Of Reason As Applied
To League Sports
Courts are hesitant to use per se rules in league sports because of the
unique nature of such leagues. It is difficult to analyze the "negative and
positive effects of a business practice in an industry which does not read-
ily fit into the antitrust context."'" Thus, courts tend to apply the rule
of reason analysis. In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. 101 ("Smith"), the appel-
late court relied on the rule of reason to determine whether a restraint
arising out of the NFL player draft was significantly anti-competitive in
purpose or effect. 10 The court had to decide if the NFL clubs had com-
bined to exclude competitors or potential competitors from the market
via the player draft."°3 The Smith court relied on the Supreme Court's
analysis in Standard Oil, and stated that "Standard Oil established a ju-
dicial gloss on the statute which made the 'rule of reason' the prevailing
mode of analysis."" ° Therefore, the Smith court did not invoke a per se
rule of illegality even though the NFL clubs operate as a joint venture,
which in other markets would be considered per se illegal. 105 The court
stated:
The NFL player draft differs from the classic group boycott
(joint venture) in two significant respects. First, the NFL clubs
which have "combined" to implement the draft are not compet-
itors in any economic sense. The clubs operate basically as a
joint venture.., in producing an entertainment product-foot-
ball games and telecasts. No NFL club can produce this prod-
uct without agreements and joint action with every other team.
To this end, the League not only determines franchise loca-
tions, playing schedules, and broadcast terms, but also ensures
that the clubs receive equal shares of telecast and ticket reve-
nues. These economic joint ventures "compete" on the playing
field, to be sure, but here as well cooperation is essential if the
entertainment product is to attain a high quality: only if the
teams are "competitively balanced" will spectator interest be
maintained at a high pitch. No NFL team, in short, is inter-
ested in driving another team out of business, whether in the
counting-house or on the football field, for if the League fails,
100. Raiders I, 726 F.2d 1381, 1391 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
101. 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
102. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., ("Smith"), 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1178.
105. Id. at 1179-80.
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no single team can survive.' °6
The Smith court determined that although the restraint may have had
legitimate business purposes, the "anti-competitive evils" outweighed
any "pro-competitive virtues," and thus violated antitrust laws.107
The rule of reason was the mode of analysis in another popular anti-
trust sports league case. In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of
Regentso ("Board of Regents"), the NCAA's rule regulating the televis-
ing of college football games was questioned as a restraint of trade in
violation of antitrust laws.'0 9 The rule constituted a restraint of trade
because "it limited members' freedom to negotiate and enter into their
own television contracts."" 0 This restraint would violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act if it was an unreasonable restraint of trade. Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, found that the NCAA's rule constituted price
fixing, but, because of the nature of the NCAA's industry, "restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all."' Thus,
even though this type of price fixing is generally presumed to be unrea-
sonable and illegal per se in other markets," 2 the rule of reason was uti-
lized here because the NCAA provided such a unique product." 3
Notwithstanding the rule of reason analysis, the NCAA restraints were
found to be unjustified and thus illegal under the antitrust laws."'
This decision reflects the Supreme Court's preference to apply the
rule of reason analysis when a trade restraint restriction exists, provided
that such a restriction is necessary for that product to be produced. In
professional sports leagues, teams cooperate with one another with
league restrictions in order for that league's sport to be produced. Thus,
if a professional sports league argues that its relocation restriction is nec-
essary for the league to exist and produce its product, given Board of
Regents, it is arguable that the rule of reason analysis should apply to
professional sports leagues.
Because of the limited number of cases involving franchise reloca-
tion in professional sports, it is not clear whether league rules are per se
106. Id. at 1178-79 (citations omitted).
107. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1183 (citing Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An
Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 983 (1977)).
108. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
109. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents ("Board of Regents"),
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
110. Id. at 96-97.
111. Id. at 101.
112. Id. at 99.
113. Id. at 99-100.
114. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100.
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invalid." 5 As a result, and given the Supreme Court's preference for the
rule of reason, courts have opted to apply rule of reason analysis when
confronted with a professional sports franchise relocation restriction.' 16
VII. RAIDERS : THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW IN
THE NINTH CIRCUIT PERTAINING To SPORTS LEAGUES'
FRANCHISE RELOCATION RULES
The Ninth Circuit's current interpretation of antitrust law regarding
the relocation of a professional sports franchise developed when the Oak-
land Raiders' lease with the Oakland Coliseum was due to expire, and
managing general partner Al Davis requested Oakland officials to en-
hance and improve the Raiders' stadium." 7 When Oakland officials re-
jected his requests, Davis searched for a better stadium. When Davis
contacted the Los Angeles Coliseum, a Raiders' move seemed imminent.
Once an announcement was made that the Raiders were moving to Los
Angeles, the NFL sought an injunction to prevent the move." 18
The above events led to Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
National Football League' ' ("Raiders I"), which is the precedential case
in the Ninth Circuit. In Raiders I, the Oakland Raiders challenged NFL
rule 4.3 which required approval by three-fourths of the member teams
before one team could relocate into another team's league territory. The
Raiders claimed that rule 4.3 violated federal antitrust law. 2 o The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that NFL teams are separate busi-
ness entities with products having an independent value.' 2 ' The appel-
late court, therefore, determined that the NFL's relocation rule
warranted rule of reason scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act.'22
Given the unique nature or "peculiarity" of the NFL, the Raiders I
court, under Professional Engineers, 123 properly applied the rule of rea-
son test. The court's application was proper because it relied on the dis-
trict court's finding that professional football is a unique business, and as
such, made the application of a per se rule inappropriate. 124
115. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1387.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1385.
118. Id.
119. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
120. Id. at 1381-82.
121. Raiders I, 519 F. Supp. at 585.
122. Raiders , 726 F.2d at 1389.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
124. Raiders , 726 F.2d at 1387 (citing Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
N.F.L., 468 F. Supp. 154, 164-68 (C.D. Cal. 1979)).
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A. Raiders I: Three Part Rule Of Reason Analysis
1. Professional Sports Leagues Are Not Single Business Entities
The district court first considered whether the NFL was a single
business entity for purposes of the Raiders' lawsuit.' 25 The court stated
that "[o]n its face, the NFL certainly appears to be an association of
separate business entities rather than one single enterprise."' 6 The dis-
trict court found that the NFL did not possess features ordinarily found
in a single entity. 127 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
sidered the fact that: (1) no individual team in the NFL shares its profits
or losses;128 (2) NFL policies are not set by one individual or parent cor-
poration, but by the separate teams acting jointly; 29 (3) each franchise is
managed independently; 3 and (4) each makes its own decisions on hir-
ing staff and players, and on entering contracts for concession and ticket
sales, advertising and community work.13'
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the NFL
is not a single business entity. 132 Essentially, the Ninth Circuit did not
want to immunize the NFL from scrutiny under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. 133 The court found that although NFL clubs have certain
common purposes, they do not operate as a single business entity.
34
Thus, the plaintiff satisfied the first element necessary to demonstrate a
cause of action for restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.
2. Anti-Competitive Action
The district court next considered whether the NFL's exclusive ter-
ritory rule, rule 4.3, was intended to harm or unreasonably restrain
trade. 135 The NFL adopted rule 4.3 to assure franchise owners that no
125. Raiders I. 519 F. Supp. at 582.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 583.
128. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1388-89.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1387.
133. The circuit court cited North Am. Soccer League v. N.F.L. ("N.A.S.L. "), 670 F.2d
1249, 1257, (2d Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982), and stated:
To tolerate such a loophole would permit league members to escape antitrust respon-
sibility for any restraint entered into by them that would benefit their league or en-
hance their ability to compete even though the benefit would be outweighed by its
anti-competitive effects. Moreover, the restraint might be one adopted more for the
protection of individual league members from competition than to help the league.
134. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1388-89.
135. Id. at 1394-95.
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other NFL team would move into their team's exclusive area to compete
economically.' 36 Team owners viewed rule 4.3 as a keystone to their
franchise's success and stability.'37
At trial, the NFL admitted that the purpose of rule 4.3 was to re-
strain competition within the league.' 38 As a result of this admission, the
Raiders I court declared that the NFL's relocation rule "on its face [is]
an agreement to control, if not prevent, competition among NFL teams
through territorial divisions."'' 39 Accordingly, rule 4.3 was found to be
anti-competitive in nature, and a violation of antitrust law."
3. Harm To Consumers
Unlike the first two elements, the Raiders found the final element,
actual injury, more difficult to establish. The court required actual injury
or "[p]roof that the defendant's activities had an impact upon competi-
tion in a relevant market."'14' However, the relevant market was not
clearly defined in court because each party previously stipulated as to
how the relevant market would be defined.1 42 In fact, as an aid to the
jury, economic expert reports and exhibits were supposedly incorporated
into the court transcript.' 43 The Ninth Circuit's review, however, indi-
cated that no such evidence was presented to the jury. 144 Nonetheless,
the court found the subject satisfactorily covered in other testimony
which substantiated "the jury's finding that rule 4.3 [was] an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade [resulting in harm]."'
' 45
Additionally, the court examined the doctrine of ancillary restraints
which would have allowed rule 4.3 to restrain trade if it was subordinate
or collateral to another legitimate purpose. 4 6 Despite the ancillary re-
straint doctrine, the court properly found that the NFL's goal of
franchise stability and maintaining regional balance could be achieved
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1395.
139. Raiders , 726 F.2d at 1391. Rule 4.3, which is reprinted in the addendum in full, is
the rule referred to here.
140. Id. at 1382.
141. Id. at 1391 (quoting Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 291 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980)).
142. Id. at 1392.
143. Id.
144. Raiders L 726 F.2d at 1392.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1395.
1990]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
with less restrictive and less harmful alternatives than rule 4.3. 4 In es-
sence, and without further discussion of the ancillary restraint doctrine,
the court found that the plaintiff had proved the third element of the
cause of action.
Because professional sports leagues do not have single entity status,
relocation restrictions can be viewed as agreements between two or more
persons which may unreasonably restrain trade. Therefore, when this
issue arises, courts will opt to use the rule of reason test.'48 In Raiders I,
the court applied the rule of reason analysis and established that the
NFL's franchise relocation rule was: "(1) An agreement among two or
more persons or distinct business entities; (2) Which [was] intended to
harm or unreasonably restrain competition; (3) And which actually
cause[d] injury to competition."' 49
B. Significance Of Raiders I Case
When the rule of reason was applied to the NFL's franchise reloca-
tion restriction, the circuit court in Raiders I thoroughly analyzed the
industry at issue,' 5 ° and balanced the positive and negative effects on
competition.' 5 ' The court found that the NFL's relocation rule,' 52 was
"on its face an agreement to control, if not prevent, competition among
the NFL teams through territorial divisions. "153 The court looked to the
relevant market to balance the positive and negative effects of the re-
straint on competition. 5 4 The Raiders I court noted that the "relevant
market" has two components: (1) the product market and (2) the geo-
graphic market.
55
The product market involves:
[T]he process of describing those groups of producers which,
because of the similarity of their products, have the ability-
actual or potential-to take significant amounts of business
away from each other. A market definition must look at all
relevant sources of supply, either actual rivals or eager poten-
147. Id. at 1396. The Ninth Circuit did not expand on what these alternatives were, but
merely stated "there was substantial evidence going to the existence of such alternatives." Id.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 100-116.
149. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1391 (quoting Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 290
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980)).
150. Id. at 1391.
151. Id.
152. See infra addendum for NFL relocation rule.
153. Raiders 1. 726 F.2d at 1391.
154. Id. at 1392, citing Kaplan, 611 F.2d at 292 (quoting Smith K-line Corp. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978)).
155. Id. at 1392-94.
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tial entrants to the market. 56
The geographic market is defined as where the seller sells and where
the buyer will practically buy."' Taking the above into account, the cir-
cuit court determined that the critical question was whether the reloca-
tion rule reasonably promoted the NFL's product or harmed its
competition. 58 The division of exclusive territories, the court concluded,
insulated teams from competition within the NFL market, 5 9 and "effec-
tively foreclose[d] free competition among stadia such as the Los Angeles
Coliseum that wish to secure NFL tenants."'" Because of the above
findings, and because less restrictive alternatives were available, the jury
correctly found the NFL's relocation rule to be an unreasonable restraint
of trade in violation of antitrust laws.
161
The circuit court recognized that:
[T]he NFL made no showing that the transfer of the Raiders to
Los Angeles would have any harmful effect on the League. Los
Angeles is a market large enough for the successful operation of
two teams, there would be no scheduling difficulties, facilities at
the L.A. Coliseum are more than adequate, and no loss of fu-
ture television revenue was foreseen. Also, the NFL offered no
evidence that its interest in maintaining regional balance would
be adversely affected by a move of a northern California team
to southern California. 
1 62
Furthermore, the Raiders I court stated:
To withstand antitrust scrutiny, restrictions on team movement
should be more closely tailored to serve the needs inherent in
producing the NFL "product" and competing with other forms
of entertainment. An express recognition and consideration of
those objective factors espoused by the NFL as important, such
as population, economic projections, facilities, regional balance,
etc., would be well advised.
1 63
Taking the above findings into account, Raiders I established the Ninth
Circuit's approach to this area by "applying the rule of reason [analysis]
to a sports league's franchise relocation rule, a business practice in an
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1393.
158. Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1394.
159. Id. at 1395. The court noted that exclusive territories allow each individual team to set
monopoly prices to the detriment of the consuming public. Id.
160. Id. at 1395.
161. Id. at 1396.
162. Id. at 1397.
163. Raiders , 726 F.2d at 1397.
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industry which does not readily fit into the antitrust context."'"
VIII. APPLICATION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT RULE To THE NBA's
FRANCHISE RELOCATION RULE IN SDC BASKETBALL CLUB
A. Single Entity Exemption From Section 1?
Whether or not the NBA is a single business entity is a question of
fact. The NBA attempts to restrict franchises from relocating into an
already existing franchise territory by requiring prior approval from the
team encroached upon.'6 5 In effect, assuming that the NBA does not
compete in a broad market defined as entertainment, the NBA attempts
to divide sales territories of the NBA's product - professional basketball
- into exclusive areas free of competition.' 66 This division of territory,
given Raiders , 67 seems to unreasonably restrain trade and reduce com-
petition, resulting in harm to consumers.
Any attempt by the NBA to assert that it comes within the Cop-
perweld holding should fail. For example, the NBA may argue that be-
cause it is a single business entity comprised of wholly owned
subsidiaries, it cannot conspire under section 1.168 However, the NBA is
similar to the NFL in several respects. Aside from the obvious differ-
164. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 567, (quoting Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1391).
165. See infra addendum for rule.
166. See Darcy v. Allen ("Darcy"), 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1602). The Darcy court held that a
patent granted to Darcy allowing for an exclusive right to manufacture and import playing
cards was a monopoly and void. Similarly, one could argue that when the NBA granted an
exclusive right allowing the Los Angeles Lakers to produce professional basketball in Los
Angeles, it created a monopoly and should be void. To illustrate, if the product market is
defined as professional basketball, and the geographic market is defined as Los Angeles, assum-
ing the Clippers were not in Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Lakers would be a monopoly in the
marketplace. (This casenote will not attempt to attack the argument that even with the
Clippers in the marketplace, the 1986-1987 World Champion Lakers monopolize anyway -
or at least on the court.) If the only show in town happens to be the best show in the world,
the producer of that show or product could charge the consumer as much or as little as he
wanted. Consequently, if someone wanted to purchase the product (ie., attend a professional
basketball game), the consumer, by not having a choice, would be exposed to monopoly prices.
Without the competition of other professional basketball teams in Los Angeles, combined with
the NBA's Constitutional rule which limits franchise movement and entry into the NBA, ar-
guably, antitrust laws are violated because monopolies are created by the unlawful restraints of
trade. This approach is very narrow, however, because by changing the definition of the prod-
uct market to all basketball or an even broader definition of entertainment in general, there
would be a great deal of competition in the market. Thus, the Lakers and the NBA would not
have the monopolistic power to control price and exclude competition. Also, if the geographic
definition was expanded to include the state of California or the United States, the Lakers and
the NBA would not have the market power of a monopolist.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 135-40.
168. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 753.
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ences of the sports, players, teams, coaches and so on, both the NBA and
the NFL are professional sports leagues each having their own unique
product. By analogy, therefore, the NBA, with twenty-five separate legal
entities and no common owners, like the NFL, is not properly considered
as a single enterprise incapable of Sherman Act conspiracy. 69 To hold
that the NBA is a single entity would be tantamount to saying that any
group of separate entities who joined together (conspired) in any com-
mon organization is a single business.' 7 °
Since the NBA clearly is not a single business entity, the question
becomes what facts are sufficient to create an inference of conspiracy in
violation of antitrust laws. Does the mere existence of a franchise reloca-
tion rule in the NBA Constitution constitute conspiracy?
Parallel conduct alone does not mean that there is a conspiracy. 7 '
For example, two businesses in the same market who sell the same mer-
chandise, may have the same prices on similar goods without any agree-
ment. 172 To have a Sherman Act section 1 violation, both concerted
action and an agreement are necessary. 73 Thus, to analyze the reloca-
tion rule of the NBA or any other professional sports league rule, the
antitrust analyst must ask the initial question of whether there is con-
certed action and an express contract or agreement. If the answer is in
the affirmative, then it must be determined whether to apply the rule of
reason analysis or the per se rule of invalidity.
169. There have been some cases, however, where professional sports leagues have sought
protection from § 1 of the Sherman Act by claiming to have single entity status. See, e.g., San
Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974). Where
the court defined the product market as production of professional hockey games before live
audiences and the geographic market was broadly defined as the United States and Canada.
Thus, because at least two business entities are needed to conspire or combine to restrain trade,
the San Francisco Seals, as a league member, did not compete in the economic sense with the
league or other members. Id. at 970. Therefore, the territorial restraints imposed by the
league did not restrain trade or commerce within the relevant market place in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. The district court in Raiders II distinguished this case from
Raiders . For decisions reaching an opposite conclusion see Lazaroff, infra note 225, at 169,
n.49.
170. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 567.
171. See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp. ("Paramount"),
346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954). In Paramount, Justice Clark writing for the majority, wrote that
"this Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior conclusively establishes
agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense."
Id. at 541.
172. See Id.
173. 15 U.S.C.A. I (West 1973 & 1988 Supp.).
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B. Per Se Rule Of Illegality vs. Rule Of Reason As Applied To SDC
Basketball Club
As previously discussed, 174 the Raiders I court found the NFL's re-
location restriction to be an "agreement" by "distinct business entities,"
that "harm[ed] or unreasonably restrain[ed] competition." '175 The pres-
ence of relocation restrictions in professional sports constitutions gives
rise to the question of whether Sherman Act restraint of trade violations
exist. Because professional sports leagues are unique, and because
franchise relocation restrictions are relatively new to litigation, courts are
hesitant to apply per se rules of illegality in sports league antitrust cases.
In fact, the district court judge in Raiders I found that the unique nature
of the business of professional football made application of a per se rule
inappropriate. 176 Therefore, the unique business nature of professional
basketball should also make application of the per se rule
inappropriate. 177
In Raiders I, the court held that a jury could find that it was an
unreasonable restraint of trade to apply the NFL's franchise movement
rule. 7 ' The Raiders II court affirmed the jury's liability verdict in Raid-
ers I, and held the franchise movement rule invalid only as it applied to
the Raiders' proposed move to Los Angeles. 179 Neither the Raiders I nor
the Raiders II opinion recognized that the NFL's franchise movement
rules were per se invalid under antitrust laws. Therefore, in SDC Basket-
ball Club, the Clippers could not assert that the Raiders' cases mandated
summary judgment in its own case. However, the Clippers could assert
that the Raiders court decisions should serve as a guideline for invalidat-
ing the NBA's franchise relocation rule using the rule of reason under
antitrust law. 1
80
174. See supra text accompanying notes 125-49.
175. Raiders , 726 F.2d at 1391.
176. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 468 F. Supp.
154, 164-68 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
177. For a discussion on limiting the use of per se rules and using the rule of reason, see
Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review of Antitrust Developments: Horizontal Restrictions, Efficiency,
and the Per Se Rule, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1019 (1986). See also Knetsch, A Uniform Rule of
Reason for Vertical and Horizontal Nonprice Restraints, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 441 (1982);
Douek, A Proposed Rule of Reason Analysis For Restrictions on Distribution, 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 527 (1979); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977).
178. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 567 (citing Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1398).
179. Id. (citing Raiders 11, 791 F.2d at 1369). See infra addendum for Franchise Move-
ment Rule 4.3.
180. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 567. See also Bork, "Ancillary Restraints and the
Sherman Act," 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. 211, 231-34 (1959).
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C. Summary Judgment Reversal And Remand In Favor Of Applying
The Rule Of Reason Analysis To SDC Basketball Club
Although the district court judge in SDC Basketball Club only had
the Raiders I opinion available to him, as Raiders II had not yet been
decided, the circuit court relied on both the Raiders I and Raiders II
opinions. 81 According to Raiders I and Raiders II, a rule of reason
analysis is to be used when a professional sports league attempts to re-
strict franchise relocation.8 2
In SDC Basketball Club, the Ninth Circuit stated that a careful
analysis of Raiders I clearly showed that franchise relocation restrictions
in professional sports leagues were not illegal per se.' 8 3 However,
franchise relocation restrictions may be found invalid under the rule of
reason.'84 It reasoned that the district court judge should not have
granted summary judgment against the NBA since a jury could find facts
indicating that there was no unreasonable restraint of trade. 85 The
court, for example, pointed out that the mere existence of article 9, arti-
cle 9A, and various other provisions for franchise relocation evaluation
cannot violate antitrust law.' 86 The question of what is a reasonable re-
straint of trade is a question of fact that should be decided by a jury.
87
The Ninth Circuit noted that the factual issues presented in SDC
Basketball Club were different from those presented in Raiders 1. "8 Ad-
ditionally, the court found the antitrust issue presented by the Clippers
differed from the antitrust issues in Raiders I and Raiders I 189 The
court stated that the issue in SDC Basketball Club was "whether the
mere requirement that a team seek [NBA] Board of Governors approval
before it seizes a new franchise location violates the Sherman Act."' 9 °
The circuit court reasoned that since the NBA scheduled the Clippers'
181. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 567.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 568.
184. Raiders 1, 729 F.2d 1391.
185. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 568.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. The NBA's issues of fact asserted include:
(1) the purpose of the restraint as demonstrated by the NBA's use of a variety of
criteria in evaluating franchise movement, (2) the market created by professional
basketball, which the NBA alleges is substantially different from that of professional
football, and (3) the actual effect the NBA's limitations on movements might have on
trade.
SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 568.
189. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 568.
190. Id. (emphasis in original).
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home games in Los Angeles, it did not attempt to forbid their move.191
The NBA, consequently, decided to bring suit for declaratory relief when
it faced assertions of antitrust liability. 192 As a result, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's judgment against the NBA when it found
that reasonableness of the restraint is an issue of fact that should be con-
sidered by a jury.193
The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court's dismissal of the
NBA's request for a declaration stating that the NBA Constitution al-
lowed the league to consider the Clippers' move.' 94 The court focused on
the briefs and pleadings of each party and discovered many factual dis-
putes. For example, the Clippers asserted that the NBA Constitution
had no other franchise relocation restriction at the time they moved to
Los Angeles other than the admittedly invalid article 9.195 At the same
time, the Clippers emphasized that article 9A should not be retroactively
applied,' 96 and hence, the NBA had no right to evaluate the Clippers'
move.' 97 On the other hand, the NBA contended that their right to con-
trol franchise relocations is implied by NBA general provisions. 198 The
NBA cited precedent for the imposition of charges upon new
franchises.' 99 The circuit court recognized an inconsistency in the argu-
ments as to the imposition of charges on already existing franchises mov-
ing to new locations, and new franchises entering the NBA.2" The
Clippers asserted that there should not be any regulation if it is not ex-
pressly agreed upon.2"' The NBA, however, suggested that a regulation
is implied based on the allocation of present franchise territories and pre-
cedent.2 °2 The court reasoned that when past custom is in conflict with
the language of a present agreement, an ambiguity results. 203 Thus, the
circuit court determined that evidence must be elicited to harmonize the
conflict2 ° and concluded that the case must be decided by a jury.
20
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 569.
195. Id. at 568.
196. See Brief of Appellee SDC Basketball Club, Inc. at 24, n. 10, SDC Basketball Club, 815
F.2d 562.
197. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 568.
198. Id. at 569.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 569.
203. Id. (citing Crestview Cemetery Ass'n v. Dieden, 54 Cal. 2d 744, 754, 356 P.2d 171,
178, 8 Cal. Rptr. 427, 434 (1960)).
204. Id.
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Though the parties had presented a number of other pendent claims,
the circuit court explained that as a result of the district court's summary
judgment it did not have a district court opinion, and thus could only
assume that the state claims were dismissed because the federal claims
were dismissed.2" 6 The circuit court pointed out that the district court
should have dismissed those claims without prejudice, thus allowing
them to be brought at another time.20 7
Relying on Raiders H, the Clippers contended that the NBA's
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing necessitated
the dismissal of the pendent state claims with prejudice.20 8 The circuit
court concluded, however, that the issues in Raiders II and SDC Basket-
ball Club were not identical.20 9 In Raiders II, the court concluded that
the evidence presented supported a finding that either both parties had
breached the implied promise of good faith and fair dealing or that
neither party had.210 In SDC Basketball Club, the circuit court noted, it
was not absolutely "clear which party, if any, violated the duty of good
faith and fair dealing."'2 " Essentially, the circuit court noted another
issue of fact to be considered at the trial level.21 2
The circuit court delineated a further issue of fact for the trial court
to resolve when the NBA requested that the district court enter judgment
for them under the "expansion opportunity" theory suggested in Raiders
IL. 2 3 The circuit court pointed out that the expansion opportunity the-
ory only reduced the Raiders' recovery in antitrust damages.21 4 Accord-
ingly, the court rejected the NBA's request. 2' At the same time, the
circuit court suggested that the source of recovery under the expansion
opportunity theory would have to come from the NBA Constitution and
not antitrust law.21 6
Finally, the circuit court emphasized that "pervasive issues of mate-
205. Id.
206. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 569 (citing Schultz v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718
(9th Cir. 1985), holding that district courts have discretion to dismiss pendent claims after the
federal claim has been dismissed by summary judgment).
207. Id. (citing Brandwein v. California Bd. of Osteopathic Examiners, 708 F.2d 1466,
1475 (9th Cir. 1983)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 569-70.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing Raiders I, 791 F.2d at 1371-73).
214. Id.
215. SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d at 570.
216. Id.
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rial fact" exist, supporting "the return of this case, in its entirety, to the
district court for trial." '217 Therefore, the circuit court reversed the sum-
mary judgment granted by the district court, and remanded the case back
to the district court to be decided on its merits under the rule of reason
analysis.
2 18
IX. CONCLUSION
In SDC Basketball Club, the Clippers and the NBA ultimately set-
tled out of court. The Clippers were allowed to stay in Los Angeles in
return for acknowledging the existence of article 9A of the NBA Consti-
tution, and agreeing to forego expansion funds to which they were
entitled.219
However, had SDC Basketball Club gone back to trial to be decided
on its merits, the district court would have found the NBA Constitution
void of an enforceable rule governing franchise relocations-neither arti-
cle 9 nor article 9A would have been enforceable. 220 Even though article
9 existed when the Clippers moved from San Diego to Los Angeles on
May 15, 1984, the Raiders I holding on February 28, 1984, essentially
foreclosed the NBA's use of that rule. In fact, the NBA apparently ac-
knowledged as much by declaring article 9 void and unenforceable on
June 26, 1984.221 Moreover, the NBA's substitute rule, article 9A, was
inapplicable because it was not in effect at the time the Clippers moved.
In fact, the trial court in SDC Basketball Club stated during a pretrial
conference that: "[the NBA] didn't have such a rule in effect at the time.
[It] had only the rule that required three-fourth's vote [article 9] ....,222
As a result, the NBA did not have a franchise relocation rule to apply
when the Clippers moved.
Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that the NBA did not declare arti-
cle 9 void, the court in SDC Basketball Club would have reached a simi-
lar result to that of the Raiders I court because: (1) The agreement
(article 9 of the NBA Constitution) was an agreement among two or
more business entities (each individual franchise and the league), subject
to Sherman Act section 1 scrutiny because the NBA is not a single busi-
ness entity; (2) The purpose of article 9 was intended to unreasonably
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. This information was provided by Christopher Layne, one of the attorneys for SDC
Basketball Club.
220. Brief of Appellee SDC Basketball Club, Inc. at 22, SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d
562.
221. Id. at 4.
222. Id. at 22.
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restrain trade or harm competition (by prohibiting franchise movement
creating exclusive territories); and (3) That such a rule if enforced would
have caused actual injury (to both the Clippers and consumers if the
Clippers were unable to move). Thus, according to the rule of reason
applied in Raiders I, the NBA's relocation rule would also be an agree-
ment to regulate competition among the NBA teams through territorial
divisions. In addition, the NBA restraint would have been found to per-
petuate the division of exclusive territories and would have foreclosed
direct competition among teams and stadia. The competition between
stadia, for example, would be to attract and keep reliable tenants, such as
a professional sports team, by offering quality facilities and the ability to
attract patronage. As a result, there would be less competition and the
public would become exposed to monopoly prices.223
If the NBA or NFL, as professional athletic leagues, were treated as
single business entities, the implication would be that any agreement by
all league members could not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 24
Without concerted action, which is essential to a section 1 violation, non-
competitive unilateral conduct, such as a franchise relocation rule, would
not be a violation.225 The Ninth Circuit has refused to accept the argu-
ment that the NFL, with twenty-eight separate legal entities and no com-
mon owners, is one single enterprise.226 Thus, arguably, under the rule
of reason analysis, the Ninth Circuit would have refused to accept the
NBA's argument that, with twenty-five separate legal entities and no
common owners, it constitutes one single enterprise. Given the rule of
reason analysis and holding of Raiders I, the NBA had no choice but to
declare their own relocation restriction, article 9, void. 227
223. See supra note 159.
224. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957), reh'g denied, 353
U.S. 931 (1957)(holding that antitrust laws apply to a professional athletic league).
225. For a detailed analysis of why single entity status for professional sports teams in
leagues should fail and that in franchise relocation cases, § I of the Sherman Act should apply,
see Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation Restrictions in Professional
Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 157 (1984). Also see Blecher & Daniels, Professional Sports and
the "Single Entity" Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4 WHIlTrER L. REV. 217
(1982); contra Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (1983); Kempf, The Misapplication of Antitrust Law to Professional Sports Leagues, 32
DE PAUL L. REV. 625 (1983).
226. Raiders I, 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
227. In SDC Basketball Club, the trial court stated: "I think the question is the rule you
had in effect, whether it's any good or was any good... I think, based on the Raiders decision
and the Circuit, that the rule is no damn good." Brief of Appellee SDC Basketball Club, Inc.
at 22, SDC Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562.
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To summarize, it appears that the Clippers had the right to leave
San Diego because: (1) article 9 of the NBA Constitution was voided,
leaving the NBA Constitution without a rule governing the relocation of
already existing franchises; (2) article 9A of the NBA Constitution was
inapplicable to the Clippers' move because the amendment was not
adopted with unanimous franchise approval as the NBA Constitution
requires.228 Since the Clippers' voted against adopting the amendment,
the amendment did not get incorporated properly into the NBA Consti-
tution before the Clippers moved. Thus, as in (1) above, there would be a
gap in the NBA Constitution leaving the NBA without a governing rule;
(3) If article 9A was properly adopted into the NBA Constitution, it
could not be retroactively applied to the Clippers' move because the
NBA Constitution does not have a retroactivity clause.
In combination, the above three arguments operate to defeat all of
the NBA's arguments. More important, however, is the fact that even if
the prior three arguments failed, and if the NBA had not voided article 9
of the NBA Constitution, under the rule of reason analysis set forth in
Raiders I, the only way the NBA's argument could succeed is if the NBA
were deemed a single business entity. If the NBA were a single entity,
under Copperweld, it could establish such a relocation rule because it
would not be able to conspire with itself in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.22 9 However, since the NFL is not a single business entity
under the Raiders cases, the overwhelming likelihood is that the NBA is
not a single business entity either. As a result, under the rule of reason
analysis, the NBA's franchise relocation rule would violate antitrust law
and the Clippers' move could not have been prevented by the NBA.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the NBA could not pre-
vent the Clippers from relocating. Thus, the Clippers' move could only
be prevented by non-legal duties such as loyalty to their fans or an affin-
ity for their San Diego home. The general notion that "There's No Place
Like Home" seems to ring true only in the context of professional sports
if a team has proper playing facilities,23° fan support, and, above all, can
generate adequate profits. All professional sports franchises are first and
foremost business enterprises, and if the place they call home proves in-
hospitable in a business sense, it appears that at least some owners would
prefer to find their "Home Sweet Home" in another town. In this case,
228. See infra addendum for rule.
229. See supra text accompanying note 77.
230. The Clippers received judgment for approximately $35,000 when the court found that
the operators of the San Diego Arena failed to keep the facility in adequate condition as called
for by their contract. See L.A. Times, Aug. 2, 1986, § 3, at 2, col. 1.
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the Clippers simply could not survive economically in San Diego, and
thus adopted a modified version of that old adage. The new version
reads, "There is no place like a new home, " namely, Los Angeles.
Daniel B. Rubanowitz
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ADDENDUM
Article 9 of the NBA Constitution provides:
A membership shall not be granted or transferred for operation
within the Territory of any [m]ember without the prior written
consent of such member. Anything herein contained to the
contrary notwithstanding, this provision as to territorial restric-
tions may be amended only with the consent of all the Mem-
bers of the Association. (emphasis added)
Article 9A of the NBA Constitution provides:
A Member may transfer its franchise, city of operation, or play-
ing site of any or all of its home games, to a different location,
within or outside its existing Territory, as defined in Article 10,
only in accordance with and subject to the following provisions:
(a) Application to relocate must be made in writing to the
Commissioner. The application shall identify the proposed new
location and the arena in which the Member proposes to play
its home games, and shall be accompanied by a certified check
in the sum of $50,000 to defray the costs of the investigation of
the application. Following the disposition of any application
the Association shall repay to the applicant the sum of $50,000,
less all expenses reasonably incurred in connection with the in-
vestigation of the application.
(b) No application to relocate may be made after the first
day of March preceding the season in which the proposed relo-
cation is to take effect. Within ten (10) days of the receipt of an
application to relocate, the Commissioner shall refer the appli-
cation to a Committee to investigate the application. The Com-
mittee shall be appointed by the Commissioner and shall
consist of no fewer than five Governors or Alternate Gover-
nors. Within one hundred twenty (120) days from the Com-
missioner's receipt of the application, the Committee shall
report to the Board of Governors with respect to the results of
its investigation and its recommendation of whether the appli-
cation should be granted or denied. The recommendation of
the Committee shall be based solely and exclusively upon the
following factors:
(i) Whether the proposed new location can support a
franchise in the Association or, if the proposed new location is
within the existing Territory of a Member, whether the pro-
posed new location can support another franchise. In evaluat-
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ing this factor, the Committee shall consider: existing and
projected population, income levels and age distribution; ex-
isting and projected markets for radio, broadcast television,
cable television, and other forms of audio-visual transmission of
Association games; the size, quality and location of the arena in
which the Member proposes to play its home games; and the
presence, history and popularity in the proposed new location
of other professional sports teams and major college basketball
teams.
(ii) Whether the applicant has demonstrated that it will be
able successfully to operate an Association team in the pro-
posed new location. In evaluating this factor, the Committee
shall consider the applicant's present and projected financial
condition and resources and its past performance in operating a
team in the Association.
(iii) Whether the proposed relocation is likely to have an
adverse effect upon the Association's ability to market and pro-
mote Association basketball on a nationwide basis in a diverse
group of geographic markets.
(iv) Whether the proposed new location presents particu-
lar disadvantages for the operation of the Association, such as
by creating significant travelling or scheduling difficulties or be-
cause of adverse state or local laws or regulations.
(v) Whether other Association Members, in addition to
the applicant, are interested in transferring their franchises to
the proposed new location, or whether there are persons or en-
tities interested in obtaining an expansion franchise in the pro-
posed new location. In any such event:
(A) Except as otherwise provided herein, all appli-
cants shall follow the procedures set forth in Article 6 or
this Article, as the case may be. All additional applica-
tions to establish an NBA team in the proposed new loca-
tion for the season to which the initial application relates
shall be made within forty-five (45) days of the Commis-
sioner's receipt of the initial application referred to in sub-
paragraph (a), and the one hundred twenty (120) day
period provided for in subparagraph (b) of this Article
shall be extended to no longer than forty-five (45) days af-
ter the Commissioner's receipt of the initial application.
(B) The Committee appointed pursuant to this Arti-
cle shall investigate each of the applications and shall rec-
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ommend which of the applications, if any, should be
granted. In reaching its recommendation, the Committee
shall consider all factors listed in subparagraph (b)(i-iv) of
this Article and shall also consider:
(i) which applicant is likely to operate most successfully in
the proposed new location, or otherwise best serve the interests
of the Association; and
(ii) in the case of a proposed expansion franchise, whether
the interests of the Association would best be served by ex-
panding the number of members in the Association.
(C) The Committee is empowered to require from the
applicant, and applicant shall furnish, such information as
the Committee deems appropriate for the conduct of its
investigation. The Committee may engage consultants or
other experts to assist it in the investigation of the applica-
tion and may also request such additional information
from the Commissioner as the Committee may deem ap-
propriate for the conduct of its investigation. All informa-
tion supplied to the Committee pursuant to this
subparagraph (c) shall be made available to the applicant,
and the applicant shall be afforded an opportunity to ap-
pear before the Committee to present whatever additional
information or arguments the applicant desires. Any other
Governor or his representative may also appear before the
Committee to present whatever information or arguments
such Governor desires.
(D) The report and recommendation of the Commit-
tee shall be delivered to each Member of the Board of
Governors. The Commissioner shall call a meeting of the
Board of Governors to consider the Committee's report
and recommendation, which meeting shall be held no
sooner than seven (7) days and no later than thirty (30)
days of delivery of the Committee's report and recommen-
dation. The applicant shall be afforded an opportunity to
appear before the Board of Governors to present whatever
information or arguments the applicant desires. The ques-
tion whether to approve the proposed relocation shall be
decided by a majority vote of all of the members, and no
vote by proxy shall be permitted. The vote of each Gover-
nor on the proposed relocation shall be based solely and
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exclusively upon the factors listed in subparagraph (b)(i
through v) of this Article.
NBA CONST. art. 9A.
The NFL's rule on franchise relocation is Rule 4.3. Rule 4.3 originally
read:
Any transfer of an existing franchise to a location within the
home territory of any other club shall only be effective if ap-
proved by a unanimous vote; any other transfer shall only be
effective if approved by the affirmative vote of not less than
three-fourths or 20, whichever is greater, of the member clubs
of the League.
After its 1978 amendment, Rule 4.3 states:
The League shall have exclusive control of the exhibition of
football games by member clubs within the home territory of
each member. No member club shall have the right to transfer
its franchise or playing site to a different city, either within or
outside its home territory, without prior approval by the affirm-
ative vote of three-fourths of the existing member clubs of the
League.
Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1385, n.1.
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